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It is widely believed that further economic integration such as the enlargement of the EU to 
25 countries through the integration of Central and Eastern European countries in May 2004 
lead to painful adjustment processes within core and periphery countries. While some worry 
about the maintenance of large welfare states, others are concerned about remaining competi-
tive. Considering tax competition for example, mobile factors are generally assumed to locate 
to regions, where taxes are low and/or the provision of public goods is high. Periphery coun-
tries therefore may decrease taxes to attract mobile factors pushing local economic develop-
ment at the core countries’ expense. As a result, countries adapt the same tax rates leading to 
“a race to the bottom” and to a sub-optimal provision of public goods as predicted by the 
standard tax competition literature, (e.g. Wilson, 1999). Accordingly, the overall provision of 
public goods would decline towards the lowest level within member states. Hence, should the 
EU consider tax harmonization to maintain social welfare? If not, should the cutback of factor 
mobility restriction be reversed as analyzed in Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) or, according to 
Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002), taxes be imposed to control such factor flows? 
While capital is more likely to move to regions, where taxes are low and risk adjusted prof-
its are high, the migration decision of labor takes into account taxes, wages and the provision 
of public goods. When factor owners move with their factors, countries compete with the 
provision of public goods such as the inclusion in social systems, education and/or security 
aspects amongst others. Hence, factor owners move to countries, even if income taxes are 
high, as long as the net incentive to migrate is positive. Furthermore, agglomeration rents in 
industrial clusters and/or industrialized countries can be taxed without provoking an outflow 
of input factors or a loss of industry shares. While there is no inherent incentive of clustering 
in the standard tax competition (perfect competition, constant return of scale), tax competition 
in the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature is different. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) 
show first “a race to the top” of tax rates among core countries and later, as integration con-
tinues, also among the periphery countries.
1 Baldwin et al. (2003) show amongst other things, 
that tax competition on mobile factors will result in the first best tax rate if factor owners 
move with their factors and governments are concerned about the mobile factor. Hence, tax 
competition would not harm social welfare at all with no “race to the bottom”. In Anderson 
and Forslid (2003), a small redistribution between mobile and immobile factor shares due to a 
                                                 
1 They underline their findings by empirical observation of the average total and corporate tax rates during the 
European integration process (1965-1994). 
  2coordinated tax increase on mobile factors may lead to a catastrophic agglomeration with all 
industry and skilled labor concentrated. There is no need for an international tax difference 
and tax competition to cause industrial agglomerations. 
In short, tax competition differs in models with labor as the taxable mobile factor and ag-
glomeration rents. The paper studies tax competition and the provision of public goods, which 
is not present in the Baldwin and Krugman (2004) model and other contributions so far, and 
its impact on industrial agglomeration and migration. The structure of the paper is described 
as follows. Basic intuition about the model and its key features are presented in the section 
below. Section 3 present a standard NEG-model and introduces public goods. Steady state 
analysis of tax competition and the results of numerical simulation are given in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes. Finally, I list specific details about the numerical simulation and deriva-
tives in appendix (A) and (B) respectively. 
 
2. Agglomeration, Migration and Tax Competition 
 
Following Hirschmann (1958) cost and demand linkages arise as firms are able to use inter-
mediate goods more cheaply and face a greater consumer demand, where other firms and 
consumers are concentrated. This leads to circular causality and to self-reinforcing agglom-
eration effects of industrial activity (centripetal forces). At the same time competition in 
product and factor markets increases with the number of locally concentrated firms. These 
neoclassical forces as well as trade and transportation costs work against industrial agglom-
eration (centrifugal forces). Hence, the trade off between these two forces determines the 
pattern of industrialization and the distribution of mobile factors between countries. As a key 
feature of NEG-models, spatial concentration of industry occurs when trade (transport) costs 
are at an intermediate level, whereas at high and at low trade (transport) costs industrial activ-
ity is more likely to be equally distributed. To cope with, I assume an agglomeration model 
with Marshallian externalities
2 and add international migration of skilled labor and the provi-
sion of public goods. The model allows analyzing tax competition and public goods as ag-
glomeration forces as well as trade and migration restriction are present. 
 
                                                 
2 For Marshall (1890) “mass production, the availability of specialized input services and the formation of highly 
skilled labor as well as the production of new ideas are crucial for the formation of industrial clusters”; see Fujita 
and Thisse (2002). 
  3International Migration and R&D Activity 
I assume skilled labor as a single input factor employed in a public R&D sector. I further 
assume that firm’ fix costs are reduced by the use of public financed research results, which 
itself depends on the presence of skilled labor. This idea is derived from Ottaviano (2001) and 
Forslid (1999), where a “footloose entrepreneur” is required as a fixed input to produce one 
single variety of industrial goods. Hence, the location of industry is driven by migration ow-
ing to real wage differences. In this paper, immigration of skilled labor leads to higher domes-
tic R&D and therefore to lower break-even points for firms. Firm location is driven by short 
run profits and higher market entries of firms. If this leads to higher real wages, as factor 
market competition increases and price index decreases, further immigration occurs with a 
positive impact on industrial clusters. As in Forslid (1999), the presence of skilled labor de-
termines the number of firms and industrial goods. If and to what extent factor mobility re-
striction and migration costs affect industrial agglomeration are therefore of major interest. 
Studies such as from Feldman and Florida (1994) emphasize the link of skilled labor, R&D 
activity and the clustering of firms. Accordingly, innovation is more likely to cluster in re-
gions where R&D–oriented firms and universities are established and that their diffusion rate 
to structurally backward regions is relatively slow. As such regions become more attractive 
further concentration of firms and mobile factors occurs, pushing a region’s capacity to inno-
vate and grow. 
 
Public Goods and Tax Competition 
I impose a lump-sum income tax to finance public research activity. Taxes are levied on 
mobile as well as on immobile factors, and income is spent in the host country, where factors 
are employed and being taxed (“origin principle” in tax lexicon). There are no factors repatri-
ating earnings and GDP and GNI do not differ. Turning to government objectives and the 
provision of public goods, governments may concern about a representative consumer and 
adopt its objectives (Benthamite objectives), a specific group and choose objectives by a 
median voter (Non-Benthamite objectives) or their own objectives (Leviathan governments). 
Moreover, tax competition in standard NEG-models with labor as the mobile factor relies on 
the kind of initial equilibrium. Circular causality due to cost and demand linkages as well as 
migration flows causes industrial activity either being equally distributed between countries 
(symmetric equilibrium) or fully concentrated (asymmetric equilibrium). Hence, it is not 
possible to analyze partial agglomeration and tax competition as in Borck and Pflüger (2005). 
Tax competition is modeled for both equilibria as a non-cooperation game. 
  43. A Static Equilibrium Model 
 
The model relies on the concept of monopolistic competition from Spence (1976) and Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977), and its adaptation to regional economics by Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and 
Krugman and Venables (1995). Additionally, I assume vertical linkages among firms like in 
Venables (1996), Fujita, Krugman und Venables (1999) and Fujita and Thisse (2002). To deal 
with economic integration, iceberg trade costs as proposed by Samuelson (1954) are intro-
duced. All corresponding key features as discussed by Baldwin et al. (2003) are present: 
agglomeration via the home-market effect, demand and cost linkages, endogenous asymme-
try, catastrophic agglomeration, path-dependency, hump-shaped agglomeration rents, and 
multiple long run equilibria. In defining government utility function and tax competition, I 
follow Baldwin et al. (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004). 
 
3.1. Assumptions 
There are two countries  , with identical endowments of mobile and immobile factors 
of production (unskilled workers ( ), skilled labor ( ), land ( ), and industrial goods 
( )). Unskilled labor is mobile between sectors within a country, whereas skilled labor is 
mobile between countries. The share of land is fix between countries. Intermediate goods are 
subject to trade costs. Both countries have the same technology and there are three sectors: 
agriculture (A), manufacturing (M) and public R&D (R). I assume public financed research to 
reduce fix costs at the firm level. 
) 2 , 1 ( = i
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Agricultural Sector 
Agriculture is a Walrasian sector with perfect competition and constant returns. The homoge-
nous agricultural good ( ) is traded without costs. Production follows a Cobb–Douglas 
functional term using   and unskilled labor ( ). Unskilled labor is employed by the agri-
cultural sector as well as by the manufacturing sector. The nominal wage   rate with 
respect to unskilled labor is: 
i A Q ,
i B i A L ,
) ( ,i A w
θ θ θ
− − − =
1 1
, , ) ( B L L w i M i i A ,  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ θ , (1) 
  5with   as unskilled labor employed in the manufacturing sector,  i M L , θ  as the partial produc-
tion elasticity of unskilled labor and  B Bi = . 
Following Puga (1999), I use a restricted profit condition to express agricultural gains 
) ( ,i A π  as a function of the price of the agricultural good ( ), nominal wages and land:  i A p ,
{ } ) , ( max ) , , ( , , , , , , , , , B L f Q L w Q p B w p i A i A i A i A i A i A i A i A i A ≤ − = π . (2) 
Due to the assumption of constant returns,  i A, π  in equation (2) is homogenous of degree one 
in B and can be rewritten by   to:  1 , = i A p
) ( ) , , 1 ( , , , i A i i A i A w r B B w = π , (3) 
with   as maximized profit per unit land in country i.  ) ( ,i A i w r
 
Manufacturing Sector 
I assume monopolistic competition and increasing returns for the industrial sector. In addition 
to unskilled labor, the manufacturing sector uses an aggregate   of industrial goods h as 
an intermediate factor. Aggregate supply   follows a Cobb–Douglas functional term 
with a CES aggregate of intermediate goods: 
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with  ρ  as the degree of product differentiation,   as the number of firms (= number of 
goods) in country i and 
i N
μ  as the partial production elasticity of intermediate goods. The 
quantity of the produced good j in country i is denoted by  . The cost function  of a 
single manufacturing firm in country i is: 
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where   is the price index and   is the nominal wage rate paid in the industrial sector. 
Perfect mobility of unskilled workers across sectors ensures that the wage is identical in the 
i q i M w ,
  6manufacturing and agricultural sector ( i A i M w w , , = ). As usual, production costs of a single 
variety of firm k in country i are divided into a fixed and variable part,  i α  and β  respec-
tively. Variable costs do not differ between countries. Due to the assumption of increasing 
returns,   also represents the produced amount of good k in country i.  () k xi
Firms are price setters and are therefore able to raise prices   above marginal costs:  ) ( ,i M p
μ μ β ρ i i M i M q w k p
− =
1
, , ) / 1 ( ) ( ,   (6) 
with ( ρ / 1 ) as a constant mark-up factor. The short-term profits  ) ( ,i M π  of a firm, determined 
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with  1 ) 1 /( 1 > − = ρ σ  as the elasticity of substitution between goods and   as 
break-even output. In the long run, firm profits in equation (7) are zero. 




Public R&D Sector 
The public R&D sector uses skilled labor as the only input factor. Under the assumption of 
decreasing returns, perfect competition and a Cobb Douglas functional term, research output 
 in country i is:  ) ( i R
ι
i i H R = ,   ] [ 1 , 0 ∈ ι , (8) 
with ι  as the partial production elasticity of skilled labor. The overall research level   in 
country i is determined by the compounded output of both R&D sectors. Depending on inter-
national technology diffusion, each country has a relative share of research: 








i j i i R R R F ,  2 , 1 = j ;  i j ≠ ;     ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ Γ , (9) 
with   as the degree of technology spillover effect. A global spillover effect ( ) means 
that both countries transfer research results to each other without losing application or, to put 
it differently, without redundancy. By 
Γ 1 = Γ
0 = Γ , a country’s research level is determined by its 
own research activity.  
  7As discussed, fundamental research reduces fixed costs at the firm level: 
i i F A/ = α ,  σ σ β β / ) 1 ( − = = i , (10) 
where  A is a constant technology parameter and variable costs are normalized. Hence, a 
higher   leads to lower fixed costs and by   in equation (7) to higher short run profits and 





Government: Taxation and Utility 
A lump-sum tax ( ) on taxable income ( ) is levied to finance the public R&D sector and 
therefore skilled labor: 
i t i Y
i i H i i H w Y t , = , (11) 
with   as the nominal wage rate for skilled labor in country i.   is traced back to factor 
income of unskilled and skilled labor as well as to gains resulting from agriculture and manu-
facturing: 
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with   as GDP. Note that   consists only of factor income of unqualified labor, agri-
cultural gains and short run profits: within a country, an income tax and its redistribution as 





Following Baldwin et al. (2003), the utility function   for a government with Bentha-
mite objectives can be stated as: 
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  8with  i ψ  as the public good preference in country i.   is the provision of public goods and 
 is the consumption of a representative consumer after taxation. Hence, government deci-
sion in choosing the right tax rate is ambivalent. On the one hand, governments have to con-
sider that taxes obviously reduce individual consumption. On the other hand, higher tax reve-
nue and its use for the provision of public goods (i.e. higher research activity) favor the coun-
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Consumption 
A representative consumer has time-invariant, identical preferences towards goods produced 
in either country. Love of variety preferences is a Cobb–Douglas CES nest using the agricul-
tural good, an aggregate of industrial goods and public goods. Using for consumption the 
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with γ  as the consumption share of the industrial products. Optimization leads to the follow-
ing indirect utility function: 
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The first part of the indirect utility function describes exactly equation (15) in nominal terms. 
In optimizing state utility, the indirect utility function of a representative consumer is maxi-
mized as well. For analytical reasons, the price index for the industrial products is the same 
for consumers and producers. 
 
Migration-Decision of Skilled Labor 
I assume that skilled labor takes into account local tax rates, the price level, nominal wage 
rates as well as migration costs ( ). In considering nominal wages, skilled labor also ac-
counts for the provision of public goods as nominal wages are financed by lump-sum taxes, 
i m
  9which are levied in order to provide such goods. Hence, the migration condition of skilled 
labor is derived from equation (17) as: 
1
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3.2. General Equilibrium Conditions 
Owing to the assumption of increasing returns, each good is produced by a single firm k 
located in a single region. Hence, total demand for one good produced in country i is com-
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Intermediate goods are subject to iceberg trade costs  ) ( i τ  : units ( 1 , ≥ i j τ ) in country i shrink 
to one unit in country j.
3   is the producer price and is listed as the free-on-board price 
(FOB).  
) ( , k p i M
The price index for the bundle of industrial goods in country i can be written as: 
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In each country, the price index depends on local prices, which in turn depend on FOB prices 
and local trade costs. 
Total expenditure ( ) is composed of consumer and producer expenditure on industrial 
products: 
i e
dk k C C dk k w Br L w e
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with   as total migration costs of skilled labor for net immigration 
to country i.   represents the original endowment of skilled labor. Note, that if there is a net 
emigration of skilled labor ( ), migration costs for country i will be zero. Due to 
0 ) (
0
, ≥ − = i i i H i
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3 To keep analysis simple, tariff does not generate domestic income and parts of the traded quantity melt away. 
  10the assumption of lump-sum taxation and equation (11), skilled labor income does not enter 
equation (21). The first part of equation (21) stands for the net expenditure of consumers, 
while the second part represents the share of firms’ cost spending. The remaining part of cost 
spending  ) 1 ( μ −  is directed towards unskilled labor demand. 
According to Shephard’s Lemma, differentiating the cost function with respect to the un-




i M i M w dk k C L
i
, , , / ) ( 1 ∫
∈
− = μ . (22) 
Given the optimized tax rate by equation (15) and the nominal wage by equation (18), de-
mand of skilled labor is calculated by equation (11) and   to:  i i
GDP
















= . (23) 
 
3.3. Steady State Equilibrium  
Both economies are characterized by an initial equilibrium. Exogenous shocks such as trade 
liberalization, the cutback of factor mobility restrictions or strategic tax-setting lead to a 
transition phase, where countries and sectors are marked by fluctuations in firms and labor. 
Following Puga (1999), the adjustment process can be stated as: 
) , ( 2 1 , 1 N N N i M i π λ = &  and  , (24)  ) , ( 2 1 , 2 H H H i H i ϖ λ = &
with   and  as the derivatives for the quantity of firms and skilled labor with respect to 
the adjustment time, whilst reaching a new steady-state equilibrium. 
i N &
i H &
1 λ  and  2 λ  are positive 
constants whereas   as well as   are static variables.  i N i H i H, ϖ  is the real wage rate of skilled 
labor after taxation and migration costs as expressed in equation (18). The share of unskilled 
labor in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors is determined by industrial demand and is 
not included in an explicit adjustment process. 
In stable steady-state equilibrium, there are no incentives for firms to relocate and therefore 










It follows from equation (7) that  . Hence, the number of firms in coun-
try i is endogenously determined by equation (22): 
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The model and the equilibrium conditions are described by equations (1)–(26). 
 
4. Tax Competition and Strategic Tax-Setting 
 
The model is analytically not solvable owing to the discussed circular causalities. The prob-
lem arises with the assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, CES utility, and 
iceberg trade costs. Ignoring tax competition for a moment, and assuming that neither migra-
tion costs nor factor mobility restrictions exist, trade cost reduction would lead to the well 
known ‘tomahawk-bifurcation’ pattern of industrial distribution and to multiple equilibria.
4 
Given multiple solutions, the complexity of the model increases as tax competition and strate-
gic tax-setting is added to the model. Steady state analyses therefore rely on numerical simu-
lations. 
To start with, it is worthwhile to inspect government function with Benthamite objectives 
and its use to model tax competition. Turning to the impact of tax competition on steady state 
equilibria, I distinguish between two steady state equilibria. In the case of a symmetric equi-
librium with equally distributed industry and factor shares, states are primarily not interested 
in changing their status quo. Governments maximize their utility function by choosing an 
optimal tax rate either in a cooperative or a non-cooperative way. In the case of a core-
periphery equilibrium with industry shares fully concentrated in the core country, the struc-
turally backward country may have an incentive to snatch industry shares and mobile factors 
from the core country by strategic tax-setting. However, the core country may anticipate such 
strategic behavior and choose tax rates accordingly. To cope with, I adopt the limited tax 
                                                 
4 A ‘tomahawk-bifurcation’ pattern describes a symmetric equilibrium with an equal industry share in both 
countries at high and low trade costs and an asymmetric equilibrium with a concentration of industry share in 
one country at an intermediate level of trade costs. Additionally, there is a range of trade costs with multiple 
equilibria, which may lead either to full agglomeration or to symmetric distribution of industrial activity. Path 
dependency is responsible for the observed outcome. 
  12game proposed by Baldwin and Krugman (2004). The procedure in both cases is the same: I 
consider cooperation with no tax deviation first, and then introduce tax competition as a non-
cooperation game. 
 
4.1. Government Taxation and Tax Policies 
Following Baldwin et al. (2003), one way to find the optimal tax rate for a symmetric equilib-
rium is to assume initially that all factors are internationally immobile (i.e. migration condi-
tion equation (18) does not apply) and to calculate the first best tax rate. Afterwards, factor 
mobility is allowed for to show whether the result changes or not. 
Accordingly, the term   in equation (15) is a parameter and does not vary with tax 
rates. It is easy to derive from equation (15) that the first best tax rate equals the public good 
preference:  . The next step is to allow for factor mobility by equation (18). If country 1 
does not want to deviate from the first best solution nor does country 2,   would also be 
a Nash equilibrium with an equal share of mobile factors in both countries: 
. However, if one country has an incentive to deviate, the first best 
solution is not a Nash equilibrium. 
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To ascertain whether the first best solution is a Nash equilibrium or not, I differentiate gov-
ernment utility at the proposed symmetric equilibrium. Equation (15) is facilitated by drop-
ping country indexes and using two sub-functions to:  ] [ ] [ t f H g W = , with   and  ) / ( ] [ q Y H g =
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1 ) 1 ( ] [ t t t f . Total differentiation and evaluation leads to same equation as in Baldwin 
et al. (2003): 
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where  ψ = t  and  2 / 1 ) /( 2 1 1 = + = H H H SH . Due to the optimal first best tax rate, the first 
term in equation (27) is zero. Hence, the sign of   depends only on the second term and 
therefore on  . Using the definition of Y  by equation (12), I derive the following 
expression: 
dt dW /
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where  0
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V = . Derivatives are evaluated at the proposed 
symmetric equilibrium. 
A further look at equation (28) and the corresponding equations leads by comparative statis-




































                                                
. (29) 
All other things constant, a higher tax rate leads to an increase in skilled labor by equation 
(18). Hence, an increase in skilled labor increases the number of firms (V > 0) and therefore 
increases unskilled nominal wages, which decreases the agricultural profit share per unit of 
land, and decreases the price index. Finally, the elasticity of skilled wages with respect to 
skilled labor is negative.
5 The negative effect of the agricultural profit rate does not outmatch 
the other effects. As a result,   is positive and therefore   as well: countries 
have an incentive to deviate from the first-best solution by higher tax rates. The symmetric 
first-best solution is not a Nash equilibrium and optimal tax rates are derived numerically. 
dt q Y d / ) / ( dt dW /
Indeed, numerical simulations show that the optimal tax rate approaches one, which means 
a nearly 100% income transfer from immobile to mobile factors. By equation (14), govern-
ments are concerned about the provision of public goods as well as the consumption of a 
representative consumer. An income transfer from one group to another group does not affect 
consumption as a whole as GDP remains unchanged. Hence, governments with Benthamite 
objectives can raise utility by higher taxes and more public goods, while consumption ex-




5 More details about the derivatives in equation (29) are listed in appendix (B). 
  14Optimal Tax-Setting (Non-Benthamite Objectives) 
I rearrange state utility to account for those who have to carry the tax burden. Remember that 
although all factor income groups are taxed, a redistribution of tax revenue to factors em-
ployed in the R&D-sectors causes a real tax burden for the immobile factors. Hence, equation 
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with   as the consumption of immobile consumer. The Non-Benthamite objective function 
for the government is now described by a median voter model and by its adoption of the 




4.2. Tax Competition and Symmetric Equilibrium 
I assume a symmetric equilibrium with equal industry shares and identical factor endowments 
in both countries. Trade costs are high ( 0 . 3 = τ ) and spillover effects are symmetric 
( ). Furthermore, there are no migration costs and no factor mobility restrictions 
for equally industrialized countries (
5 . 0 = Γ = Γi
0 = m ).To set an optimal tax rate governments maximize 
their utility functions taking the tax rate of the counterpart as a constant. In general, govern-
ments can choose either a cooperative or a non-cooperative way. If one of these two strategies 
leads to a stable equilibrium, the corresponding tax rate as a market result should be observed. 
However, the equilibrium might not be pareto-efficient: although there is no incentive to 
deviate, there could be a solution resulting in higher utilities for both countries. This situation 
is best described with the prisoner’s dilemma. 
In the cooperation case, governments cooperate and set identical tax rates. In doing so, there 
is no additional migration and firm fluctuation preserving the industrial status. Figure 1 shows 
simulation results for government utilities with respect to tax rates ( ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ t ) assuming differ-
ent but identical public good preferences for both countries. According to Figure 1, the higher 
the preference for public goods in a country is, the more the utility function shifts to the right. 
Hence, governments increase their utility by higher tax rates. The peaks of the utility func-
tions in Figure 1 characterize the optimal tax rates. As a general result, the optimal tax rate 
increases, the stronger the preference for public goods is. However, public good preference 














Figure 1: Symmetric Equilibrium: Coordinated Tax-Setting
Analyzing a non-cooperation case, I concentrate on a preference value of  3 . 0 = ψ  and as-
sume that both countries know their optimal tax rate and their corresponding utility values if 






c t t , as presented in Figure 1, and varying country’s 2 tax rate ( ), Figure 2 
shows a range of tax rates which lead to higher utilities for country 2 than for country 1. 














Figure 2: Symmetric Equilibrium: Strategic Tax-Setting 









c t . Hence, country 2 gains by deviation (
3 . 0
*
2 3 . 0
*
2 = = >
ψ ψ
c d W W ). In attracting 
more skilled labor, the share of domestic R&D and industrial activity in country 2 would 
increase at country 1’s expense. Of course the same strategic behavior can be conceded to 
country 1. Hence, both countries would have an incentive to deviate from the cooperative 
solution by a higher tax rate. The result is a non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium, where 
both countries set identical but higher tax rates than in the cooperation case. However, these 
symmetric tax rates are suboptimal. Such a prisoner’s dilemma leaves both countries worse 
  16off, while their industrial status quo remains unchanged. The resulting redistribution of higher 
income tax revenue favors skilled labor at the expense of unskilled labor. Hence, coordinated 
tax-setting such as tax harmonization would lead to lower income taxes and therefore to a 
lower tax burden for unskilled labor.
6
 
4.3. Limited Tax Game and Agglomeration 
Turning to a core-periphery equilibrium, the structurally backward country may have an 
incentive to compete with tax rates. If this results in a higher tax yield relatively to the core 
country, offering higher wages leads skilled labor to inward migration. Reducing or reversing 
the industrialized country’s comparative cost advantage of having a high research level, firms 
begin to shift their production towards the structurally backward country. In doing so, they 
benefit not only from the increasing share of R&D activity, but also from low unskilled labor 
costs. Hence reinforcing circular processes, which were once responsible for the formation of 
the core-periphery pattern, would lead to a catch up of the structurally backward country. 
However, the core country could be aware of the strategic tax-setting of its counterpart and 
chooses its optimal tax rate in such a way as to offset the effects on migration and production 
outsourcing. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) propose a limited tax game: the core country sets 
its optimal tax rate   in the first stage, whereas the periphery country chooses its tax rate 
 in the second stage. In the third stage, migration and production occur until both econo-
mies reach steady state equilibria. 
) ( 1 t
) ( 2 t
Industrialized countries are in general characterized by a higher tax burden than developing 
countries. This might be the result of higher need and/or higher preferences towards public 
goods: rich voters tend to desire more public spending and are willing to carry a higher tax 
burden than poor voters in developing countries. As discussed by Figure 1, tax rates will 
increase the higher the preference for public goods is. Accordingly, I assume that the core 
country has a higher preference towards public good spending than the structurally backward 
country  ) ( 2 1 ψ ψ > .
7
To start with, I assume an asymmetric equilibrium with industrial agglomeration in country 
1 and agricultural hinterland in country 2. Trade costs are low  ) 1 . 1 ( = τ ). Initially, there no 
                                                 
6 The derived results remain valid for values of trade costs and public good preferences as long as there is an 
initial symmetric equilibrium. 
7 As a general result, nominal and real wages for unqualified labor are higher in the core than in the periphery. 
Considering unqualified labor as a median voter and bearing in mind that a lump-sum income tax and its redis-
tribution does not change GDP, core countries are indeed richer than the periphery.  
  17migration costs ( ). This simplification is relaxed later on. In solving the tax game, 
the second step is solved first followed by the first step: 
0 2 1 = = m m
 
(1) The tax decision of country 2 by equation (30) is solved first assuming the optimal 





d t ). 
(2) Taking into account the solution derived in step (1), country 1 tries to offset the ef-
fect of country 2’s strategic tax rate on migration flows and on firm location keep-
ing the migration condition by equation (18) unchanged. 
 
The cooperation solution, where countries do not have an interest in changing their status quo, 
is given as a benchmark. As discussed in Figure 1, each country sets its optimal tax rate ac-
cording to the public good preference. The optimum for both countries under the condition of 
cooperation and maintaining the status quo is obtained with   and   for 








3 . 0 1 = ψ  and  2 . 0 2 = ψ  respectively. 
Solving tax game step (1) numerically, country 2 takes the optimal tax rate of country 2 as a 
constant ( 43 . 0
*
1 =
c t ) and varies its tax rate in order to attract skilled labor and trigger disloca-
tion of core country’s firms. Figure 3a) shows government utilities, whereas the absolute 
number of firms is shown in Figure 3b).
8





















Figure 3: Core-Periphery: Deviation of Country 2 
Note that the utility function as well as the corresponding number of firms is discontinuous. 








d t  massive inward migration of skilled labor
9 leads to a disloca-
                                                 
*
2
8 The whole range of tax rate values is shown to give a full description of the impact of tax deviation. However, 




9 While there is a continuous flow of skilled labor from country 1 to country 2, reaching t results in a jump in 
inward migration. 
d
  18tion of firms as shown in Figure 3b). As a result, the industrialization course is reversed with 
industrial agglomeration in country 2 and agricultural production in country 1. Figure 3a) 
shows two relevant tax rates for country 2: the first tax rate   represents the uncon-
strained optimum for remaining agricultural hinterland; the second tax rate   charac-









10 However, country 2 would prefer to raise its tax 
rate in order to get the core ( ). 





Taking this into account, tax game step (2) is solved by country 1 in such a way that the ef-
fect of higher wage proposals offered by country 2 on migration decisions by equation (18) is 
neutralized. In doing so, country 1 has to increase its tax rate to offer higher wages. Equation 
(18) is rearranged to: 
CP nd eq t t Ω − − = / ) 1 ( 1
*













H CP  as the real wage gap of skilled labor,   as the equilibrium tax rate for 
country 1 to sustain the core-periphery pattern and   as country’s 2 non-deviation tax rate. 
As long as country 1 is willing to keep equation (31) unchanged by choosing a strategic tax 













d t  solved in the first step, country 1 has to be sure, that there is no incentive left 
for country 2 to an even higher tax rate. If not, country 1 has to solve tax game step (2) again, 
considering country 2’s new strategic deviation tax rate. Step (1) and (2) of the tax game will 
be repeated as long as country 2 gain the core and raise utility by deviation ( ) or 
country 1 surrender the core and rest on agricultural production. Figure 4 shows the stylized 
decision problem for country 1.






The diagram in Figure 4 reproduces the choices for country 2 in either remaining underde-
veloped (lower utility curve) or gaining the core and being industrialized (upper utility curve). 
Country 1’s decision problem is such that it has to raise its tax rate to a level where country 2 
is indifferent between   as a strategic tax rate to get the core and   as an opti-
mal tax rate to refrain from tax competition. In this case, country 2 would not deviate and 










                                                 
10 At the same time that industry shares switch from country 1 to country 2, preferences for public goods are 
adjusted such that country 2–being core country–now accounts for the higher preference. 
11 Note the difference to the model analyzed by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), where the periphery has to lower 
tax rates in order to attract mobile factors.  
  19would prefer to set the unconstrained optimal tax rate  . Having identified country’s 2 non-













         










Figure 4: Tax Game: Decision Problem of Country 1 
Finally, country 1 has to ascertain whether it is worthwhile keeping the core or not: 
un eq W W
*
1 1 ≥ , (32) 
where   corresponds to an optimal utility value being agricultural hinterland. As long as 
both countries have the same share of immobile factors, the potential to be core or periphery 
country is the same for both. Hence, the utility curves plotted in Figure 4 also apply for coun-
try 1. In any case, the periphery can only attract skilled labor to such an extent that the indus-
trialization process might be reversed by setting a higher tax rate than the core. Therefore, the 
core country’s tax rate   is always lower than  . As Figure 4 shows, keeping the core and 
engaging in tax competition is always the better choice for country 1 than losing the core 
( ). Numerical simulations prove that country 1 has to raise tax rates up to 
 in order to keep the core and to prevent country 2 being industrialized. Country 2 keep 
 as the best response to  . To sum up, tax competition leads industrialized countries to 
increase their tax rates. In pushing their comparative cost advantage of higher research activ-



















Economic Integration: Trade Liberalization 
Additionally, numerical simulations also show that as economies become closer (i.e. in terms 
of trade liberalization), the core country has to increase its tax rate to an even higher extent 
favoring therefore skilled labor at the expense of unskilled labor. Figure 5 plots equilibrium 





  20labor on the left scale. As integration continues (i.e. trade cost reduction from  1 . 1 = τ  to 
08 . 1 = τ ), tax competition pushes country 1 to increase its tax rates leaving unskilled labor 
worse off relative to skilled labor. Moreover, by migration of skilled labor to the core country, 
the wages of skilled labor in the periphery also increase, although tax rates remain unchanged. 
The real wage ratio of skilled to unskilled labor rises in country 2 but to a lower extent than in 
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Figure 5: Trade Liberalization: Relative Wages and Tax Rates 
 
Asymmetric Migration Costs 
I assume that only immigration of skilled labor from the periphery to the core country is 
accompanied with migration costs  ) 0 , 0 ( 2 1 = > m m . Or to put it differently, one can imagine 
factor mobility restrictions as quotas or qualitative requirements imposed by the industrialized 
countries in order to control migration flows. Once migration takes place, monetary costs 
such as the physical movement, the inclusion in social systems and even money transfers to 
relatives at home are sunk cost to domestic consumption of the destination country. Figure 6 
plots equilibrium tax rates   and   on the right scale and the number of firms in the core 
country on the left scale against diminishing migration costs (i.e. migration cost reduction 





1 . 0 1 = m 0 1 = m
First, the higher the migration costs are, the higher the tax rate by the core country is. The 
core country has to increase nominal wages in order to compensate for migration costs and 
  21therefore raise the incentive for skilled labor to immigrate. In contrast, the tax rate chosen by 
the periphery as an agricultural hinterland remains unchanged. As shown by Figure 6, dimin-
ishing migration costs leads to lower income taxes in the core country. Second, such migra-
tion costs are sunk costs to the industrialized countries. The share of imposed taxes used as a 
wage compensation for the occurred migration costs is lost to overall national consumption by 
equation (21). Consequently, the core’s number of firms and products is higher the lower the 
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Increasing tax competition as a direct consequence of further economic integration obliges 
industrialized countries to adapt their taxes. If countries are equal in their industry shares, the 
outcome will be income tax rates that are too high from a social perspective. If not and in the 
case of a core-periphery pattern, core countries try to offset the impact of tax competition on 
production location and migration flows. As agglomeration rents are taxed without changing 
the status quo, the standard result of a “race to the bottom” does not apply. Moreover, if factor 
owners move with their factors and account for public goods governments are more likely to 
enhance the provision of such goods. In increasing the attractiveness of the country, mobile 
factors immigrate to countries even when income taxes are high or about to be increased. 
  22As outlined above, tax-setting is not only constrained by tax competition but also by the 
extent of economic integration and factor mobility restrictions. As economic integration 
continues, it may be worthwhile for periphery countries to not engage in strategic tax-setting 
but to set a socially optimized tax rate. As factor mobility restrictions are relaxed, periphery 
countries suffer a brain drain towards core countries and loose skilled workforce as a valuable 
input for self-determining growth. In contrast, core countries, whose economic prosperity is 
partly based on the presence of such mobile factors, are willing to offer higher incentives. If 
such incentives are financed or subsidized by a lump-sum income tax, tax competition in 
economically integrating regions ends up as a higher tax burden for immobile factors. As 
integration continues, skilled labor is always favored at the expense of unskilled labor. 
As outlined by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), during the first stages of European integra-
tion average taxes were increased in all participating countries but to a higher extent in the 
industrialized core nations such as Germany or France than in the lesser industrialized South-
ern countries or in Ireland. In general, it is difficult to conclude whether increased economic 
integration and further political enlargement of the EU should be accompanied by tax har-
monization within member countries. Our analysis shows, that at least for equally industrial-
ized countries the adoption of common tax rates would be socially desirable. Particularly as 
core countries implemented full factor mobility of people inside their territories according to 
the Schengen Agreements of 1985/1991. However, if countries are different in size and eco-
nomic power, a temporary factor mobility restriction for skilled labor may serve as an ade-
quate migration policy option for prospective members. Therefore, Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries would profit from factor mobility restrictions for skilled labor at the first stages 
of economic integration. In preventing the described brain drain towards the industrialized 
countries in the EU, such countries sustain at least the opportunity for self-determining 
growth. 
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  25Appendix 
 
Specific details for parameters and numerical simulation are given in appendix (A). Further 
information about the derivatives in equation (28) is listed in appendix (B). 
 
(A) Numerical Simulation: The Choice of Parameters and the Methodology 
Numerical simulations are calculated in Gauss. Programming codes are freely available upon 
request. The parameters for numerical simulation are set to  6 . 0 = μ ,  6 = σ ,  6 . 0 = ι ,  3 . 0 = γ  
and  8 . 0 = θ . Original total factor endowment of unskilled and skilled labor as well as of 
agricultural land is assumed to be the same for both countries. Both countries have the same 
technology. The spillover effect is fixed to  5 . 0 = Γ  and β  is normalized to 
σ σ ρ β / ) 1 ( − = = . The technology parameter for firms’ fix costs is set to  .  8 / 1 = A
The methodology used for numerical simulation follows Baldwin et al. (2003) and Puga 
(1999). To analyze the impact of government taxation on economic development, tax rates are 
set first, followed by migration and production decisions until economies reach steady state 
equilibria. Once the tax rates have been set as a result of optimization or of strategic tax set-
tings, the following procedures and adjustment processes are applied: based on the prior 
determined number of operating firms ( ), the price index ( ) and nominal wages ( ) of 
unskilled labor is calculated for a short-run equilibrium. Concurrently, the share of unskilled 
labor in manufacturing ( ) and in agriculture ( ) as well as of skilled labor ( ) in 
public R&D sector is determined. The number of firms is varied and migration and produc-
tion decisions are adjusted until equation (25) is satisfied. 
i N i q i A w ,
i M L , i A L , i H
 
(B) Optimal Tax-Setting: Benthamite Objectives 
To analyze the effect of a tax change on taxable income Y by equation (12) and on state utility 
W by equation (15), differentiation of (Y/q) with respect to t at the proposed symmetric equi-
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V = . 
 
A further look at equation (18) leads to the following conclusions: 
(1)  0 >
dt
dH
: A higher tax rate leads to a higher inflow of skilled labor. Substituting equa-
tion (11) in equation (18) and using  , total differentiation at the pro-
posed symmetric equilibrium leads to following equation: 
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 Rearranging   by the use of  ] [ 2 1 1 H =  and with 
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V : A higher tax rate leads to an increase of skilled labor by equa-
tion (B.2) and therefore to a higher research output by equation (8). The availability of 
research results is restricted by the technology spillover effect: a shift of skilled labor 
from abroad also increases the national research level by equation (9). Hence, fix costs 
at firm level are reduced by equation (10). This leads by equation (26) to a higher 
number of firms. The sign of V is therefore positive. 








 V > 0 leads to a higher demand for unskilled labor in the industrial 













: V > 0 results in a higher share of unqualified labor employed in 
manufacturing and therefore in a loss of labor shares in agriculture:  . Hig-
her wages in the agricultural sector due to increased productivity of unskilled labor 
lead to a lower profit rate per unit of land by equation (3). 






: V > 0 decreases the price index by equation (20) as more firms and prod-
ucts are concentrated within one country. 






H WH ε : All other things constant, a one percent increase in skilled 
labor decreases wage rates by one percent. Wage elasticity with respect to skilled labor 

















H WH ε . (B.3) 
Re-substitution of equation (11) in equation (B.3), the wage elasticity can then be writ-
ten as: 











H WH ε . (B.4) 
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